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ABSTRACT
Biometrics are widely used for authentication in consumer devices
and business seings as they provide sufficiently strong security,
instant verification and convenience for users. However, biomet-
rics are hard to keep secret, stolen biometrics pose lifelong secu-
rity risks to users as they cannot be reset and re-issued, and trans-
actions authenticated by biometrics across different systems are
linkable and traceable back to the individual identity. In addition,
their cost-benefit analysis does not include personal implications
to users, who are least prepared for the imminent negative out-
comes, and are not oen given equally convenient alternative au-
thentication options.
We introduce ai.lock, a secret image based authenticationmethod
for mobile devices which uses an imaging sensor to reliably extract
authentication credentials similar to biometrics. Despite lacking
the regularities of biometric image features, we show that ai.lock
consistently extracts features across authentication aempts from
general user captured images, to reconstruct credentials that can
match and exceed the security of biometrics (EER = 0.71%). ai.lock
only stores a “hash” of the object’s image. Wemeasure the security
of ai.lock against brute force aacks on more than 3.5 billion au-
thentication instances built from more than 250,000 images of real
objects, and 100,000 synthetically generated images using a gen-
erative adversarial network trained on object images. We show
that the ai.lock Shannon entropy is superior to a fingerprint based
authentication built into popular mobile devices.
1 INTRODUCTION
Existing solutions to the complex mobile authentication equation
have significant problems. For instance, while biometric authen-
tication provides sufficiently strong security, instant verification
and convenience for users, biometrics are also hard to keep se-
cret and pose lifelong security risks to users when stolen, as they
cannot be reset and re-issued, More importantly, as surrendering
biometrics may become de facto mandatory [34, 43], existing vul-
nerabilities [5, 21, 51, 71], coupled with the compromise of large
scale biometrics databases [49], raise significant long term secu-
rity concerns, especially as transactions authenticated by biomet-
rics across different systems are linkable and traceable back to the
individual identity. Further, token-based authentication solutions,
e.g., SecurID [57], require an expensive infrastructure [1] (e.g. for
issuing, managing, synchronizing the token).
A secret image based authentication approach, where users au-
thenticate using arbitrary images they capturewith the device cam-
era, may address several of the above problems. For instance, the
authentication is not tied to a visual of the user’s body, but that of
a personal accessory, object, or scene. As illustrated in Figure 1, a
user sets her reference credential to be an image of a nearby object
or scene. To authenticate, the user captures a candidate image; the
authentication succeeds only if the candidate image contains the
same object or scene as the reference image. is improves on (1)
biometrics, by freeing users from personal harm, providing plau-
sible deniability, allowing multiple keys, and making revocation
and change of secret simple and (2) token-based authentication, by
eliminating the need for an expensive infrastructure. Visual token-
based solutions (e.g., based on barcodes or QR codes) [24, 41] can
be seen as special cases of secret image based authentication.
However, this approach raises new challenges. First, an adver-
sary who captures or compromises the device that stores the user’s
reference credentials (e.g. mobile device, remote server) and has ac-
cess to its storage, should not be able to learn information about
the reference credentials or their features. Second, while biometric
features such as ridge flow of fingerprints or eye socket contours
of faces, can be captured with engineered features and are invari-
ant for a given user, images of objects and general scenes lack a
well defined set of features that can be accurately used for authen-
tication purposes. Improper features will generate (i) high false
accept rates (FAR), e.g., due to non-similar images with similar fea-
ture values, and (ii) high false reject rates (FRR) that occur due to
angle, distance and illumination changes between the capture cir-
cumstances of reference and candidate images.
In a first contribution, we introduce ai.lock, a practical, secure
and efficient image based authentication system that converts gen-
eral mobile device captured images into biometric-like structures,
to be used in conjunction with secure sketch constructs and pro-
vide secure authentication and storage of credentials [§ 5].
To extract invariant features for image based authentication,
ai.lock leverages (1) the ability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)
to learn representations of the input space (i.e., embedding vectors
of images) that reflect the salient underlying explanatory factors of
the data, (2) Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [20] to identify
more distinguishing components of the embedding vectors and (3)
Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) to map the resulting components
to binary space, while preserving similarity properties in the in-
put space. We call the resulting binary values imageprints. ai.lock
builds on a secure sketch variant [17] to securely store reference
imageprints and match them to candidate imageprints.
In a second contribution, we propose the LSH-inspired notion
of locality sensitive image mapping functions (δ -LSIM), that con-
vert images to binary strings that preserve the “similarity” relation-
ships of the input space, for a desired similarity definition [§ 3]. A
δ -LSIM function can be used to efficiently match images based on
their extracted binary imageprints.
Further, we develop brute force image based aacks that aim to
defeat ai.lock. First, we perform real image aacks, that use man-
ually collected and publicly available image datasets. To evaluate
ai.lock on large scale aack images, we develop synthetic image at-
tacks that use images produced by generative models [54]. To eval-
uate the resilience of stored credentials, we introduce synthetic cre-
dential aacks, that use authentication credentials generated with
FAR EER Shannon Entropy Dataset
Solution (%) (%) (bits) size
ai.lock (MLMS) 0.0004 - 18.02 2 ×109
ai.lock (MLSS) 0.0015 0.17 16.02 6 ×106
iPhone TouchID [4] 0.0020 - 15.61 -
Deepface [65] (face) - 8.6 - > 0.5 ×109
SoundProof [33] (sound) 0.1 0.2 9.97 > 2 ×106
[62] (eye movement) 0.06 6.2 10.70 1, 602
RSA SecurID [57] - - 19.93 -
Text-based password [10] - - 10-20 7 ×107
Table 1: ai.lock variants vs. commercial and academic bio-
metric, token-based authentication solutions, and text pass-
words. ai.lockMLSS variant has no false rejects, as it is evalu-
atedunder attack samples only. Under large scale datasets of
powerful attacks, ai.lock achieves better entropy than state-
of-the-art biometric solutions.
Figure 1: ai.lock model and scenario. e user captures the
image of an object or scene with the device camera. ai.lock
converts the image to a binary imageprint, and uses it as a
biometric, in conjunction with a secure sketch solution, to
securely store authentication information on the device or
on a remote server. e user can authenticate only if she is
able to capture another image of the same object or scene.
the same distribution of the credentials extracted from manually
collected images [§ 2.1]. We have captured, collected and gener-
ated datasets of 250,332 images, and generated 1 million synthetic
credentials [§ 6.1]. We have used these datasets to generate aack
datasets containing more than 3.5 billion (3,567,458,830) authenti-
cation instances [§ 6.2].
We have implemented an ai.lock in Android using Tensorflow [3]
and show that it is resilient to aacks. Its FAR on 140 million syn-
thetic image aack samples is 0.2×10−6%. ai.lock was unbreakable
when tested with 1.4 billion synthetic credential aack samples.
e estimated Shannon entropy [60] of ai.lock on 2 billion image
pairs is 18.02 bits, comparing favorably with state-of-the-art bio-
metric solutions (see Table 1). Further, we show that ai.lock is a δ -
LSIM function, over images that we collected [§ 7.4]. ai.lock is fast,
imposing an overhead of under 1s on a Nexus 6P device. We have
released the code and data on hps://github.com/casprlab/ai.lock.
2 MODEL AND APPLICATIONS
We consider a user that has a camera equipped device, e.g., smart-
phone or tablet, a resource constrained device such as a smart
watch/glasses, or a complex cyber-physical system such as a car.
e user needs to authenticate to the device or an application back-
end, or authenticate through the device to a remote service. For
this, we assume that the user can select and easily access a physical
object or scene. To set her password, the user captures the image
of an object/scene with the device camera, see Figure 1 for an illus-
tration. ai.lock extracts a set of features from the user’s captured
reference image, then stores this information (imageprint) securely
either on the device or on a remote server. We note that, in the
former case, the device can associate the reference image with the
user’s authentication credentials (e.g. OAuth [14]) for multiple re-
mote services. To authenticate, the user needs to capture another
image. e user is able to authenticate only if the candidate image
is of the same object or scene as the reference image. Similar to e.g.,
text passwords, the user can choose to reuse objects across multi-
ple services, or use a unique object per service. Using a unique
object per service will affect memorability. However, due to the
image superiority effect [45], objects may be easier to remember
than text passwords. In the following, we describe a few applica-
tions of this model.
Alternative to biometric authentication. Instead of authenti-
cating with her sensitive and non-replaceable biometrics (face, fin-
gerprint), the user uses a unique nearby scene or object that she
carries, e.g., a trinket, Rubik’s cube with a unique paern, printed
random art, etc. ai.lock moves the source of information from the
user to an externality, as it does not require a visual of the user’s
body, but that of a personal accessory, object, or scene that the user
can recreate at authentication time. ai.lock improves on biometrics
by freeing users from personal harm, providing plausible deniabil-
ity, allowing multiple keys, and making revocation and change of
secret simple.
Location based authentication. e user chooses as password
an image of a unique scene at a frequented location (office, home,
coffee shop), e.g., section of book shelf, painting, desk cluer. is
approach can be generalized to enable location based access con-
trol, e.g., to provide restricted access to files and networks in less
secure locations.
Cyber-physical system authentication. Our model supports
authentication to cyber-physical systems, including car and door
locks, thermostat and alarm systems, where key and PIN entry
hardware [58, 59] is replaced with a camera. To authenticate, the
user needs to present her unique but replaceable authentication
object to the camera.
2.1 Adversary Model
We assume an active adversary who can physically capture or com-
promise the device that stores the user credentials. Such an adver-
sary can not only access the stored credentials, but also any keying
material stored on the device, then use it to recover encrypted data
and use it to authenticate through the proper channels. However,
we assume that the adversary does not have control over the au-
thentication device while the user authenticates (e.g., by installing
malware). We also assume an adversary with incomplete surveil-
lance [19], i.e., who can physically observe the victim during au-
thentication but cannot capture the details of the secret object.
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Furthermore, we assume that the adversary has “blackbox ac-
cess” to the authentication solution, thus can efficiently feed it im-
ages of his choice and capture the corresponding imageprint. e
adversary can use this output to learn information from the stored
credentials. More specifically, we consider the following aacks:
• Real image attack. e adversary collects large datasets of
images, e.g., manually using a mobile camera, and online. en, in
a brute force approach, he matches each image as an authentica-
tion instance against the stored reference credentials until success.
• Synthetic image attack. e adversary uses the previously
collected images to train a generative model, e.g. [23], that cap-
tures essential traits of the images, then uses the trained model to
generate a large dataset of synthetic images. Finally, the adversary
matches each such image against the reference credentials.
• Synthetic credential attack. Instead of images, the adver-
sary queries the authentication system with binary imageprints.
For this, the adversary extracts the imageprints generated by the
authentication solution on real images of his choice. He then gen-
erates a large dataset of synthetic credentials that follow the same
distribution as the extracted credentials. Finally, he matches each
synthetic credential exhaustively against the reference credentials.
• Object/scene guessing attack. While we do not consider
shoulder surfing aacks which also apply to face based authenti-
cation [35, 71], we assume an adversary that is able to guess the
victim’s secret object/scene type. e adversary then collects a
dataset of images containing the same object or scene type, then
uses them to brute force ai.lock (see Appendix B).
Finally, we assume the use of standard secure communication
channels for the remote authentication scenario where the user
credentials are stored on a server.
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION
Let I denote the space of images that can be captured by a user
with a camera. Let sim : I × I → {0, 1} be a function that returns
true when its input images have been taken with the same camera
and are of the same object or scene, and false otherwise.
Informally, the image based authenticationproblem seeks to iden-
tify a store function S : I→ {0, 1}k , and an authentication function
Auth : {0, 1}k ×{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} (for a parameter k) that satisfy the
following properties. First, it is hard for any adversary with access
to only S(R), for a reference image R ∈ I, to learn information about
R. at is, S imposes a small entropy reduction on its input image.
Second, for any candidate string C ∈ {0, 1}∗, Auth(S(R),C) = 1
only if C ∈ I and sim(R,C) = 1. us, a candidate input to the
Auth function succeeds only if it is a camera captured image of the
same object or scene as the reference image.
We observe that the secure sketch of [17] solves this problem for
biometrics: given a biometric input, the secure sketch outputs a
value that reveals lile about the input, but allows its reconstruc-
tion from another biometric input that is “similar”. erefore, the
image based authentication problem can be reduced to the prob-
lem of transforming camera captured images of arbitrary objects
and scenes into biometric-like structures.
Hence, we introduce the LSH-related notion of locality sensitive
image mapping functions. Specifically, letd : {0, 1}λ×{0, 1}λ → R
be a distance function (e.g., Hamming), where λ is a system param-
eter. en, for a given δ ∈ [0, 1], a δ -Locality Sensitive Image
Mapping (LSIM) function h satisfies the following properties:
Definition 3.1. h : I→ {0, 1}λ is a δ -LSIM function if there exist
probabilities P1 and P2, P1 > P2, s.t.:
(1) For any two images I1, I2 ∈ I, if sim(I1, I2) = true , then
d (h(I1),h(I2))
λ
< δ with probability P1.
(2) For any two images I1, I2 ∈ I, if sim(I1, I2) = f alse , then
d (h(I1),h(I2))
λ
> δ with probability P2.
4 BACKGROUND & RELATED WORK
To build ai.lock we leverage deep learning based feature extraction,
locality sensitive hashing and secure sketch constructs. In the fol-
lowing, we briefly describe these concepts.
4.1 Biometric Protection
Our work is related to the problem of protecting biometric tem-
plates. We summarize biometric protection solutions, that can be
classified into fuzzy biometric protection and feature transforma-
tion approaches [29].
Fuzzy biometric template protection. is approach leverages
error correcting codes to verify biometric data. Techniques include
secure sketch and fuzzy extractor [17], fuzzy vault [31] and fuzzy
commitment [32], and have been applied to different biometric
data, e.g. palm and hand [37].
In this paper, we extend the secure sketch under the Hamming
distance solution from [17]: reconstruct the biometric credential,
then compare its hash against a stored value. We briefly describe
here the password set and authentication procedures that we use
based on ai.lock generated imageprints (see § 5). Let ECC be a bi-
nary error correcting code, with the corresponding decoding func-
tion D, and let H be a cryptographic hash function.
• Image password set. Let R be the reference image captured
by the user and let πR = π (R) be its ai.lock computed imageprint.
Generate a random vector x , then compute and store the authenti-
cation credentials, SS(R,x) = 〈SS1, SS2〉, where SS1 = πR ⊕ECC(x)
and SS2 = H (x).
• Images based authentication. Let C be the user captured
candidate image, and let πC = π (C) be its ai.lock computed im-
ageprint (§ 5). Retrieve the stored SS value and compute x ′ =
D(πC ⊕ SS1). e authentication succeeds if H (x
′) = SS2.
Transformationbased biometric templateprotection. A trans-
formation is applied both to the biometric template and the biomet-
ric candidate, and the matching process is performed on the trans-
formed data. In an invertible transformation (a.k.a., salting [29]),
a key, e.g., a password, is used as a parameter to define the trans-
formation function [68]. e security of this approach depends
on the ability to protect the key. In contrast, in non-invertible
schemes [40, 56] a one-way transformation functions is used to pro-
tect the biometric template, making the inversion of a transformed
template computationally hard even when the key is revealed.
Hybrid approaches. Hybrid transformation and fuzzy protection
approaches have also been proposed. Nandakumar et al. [44] intro-
duced an approach to make the fingerprint fuzzy value stronger
using a password as salt. Song et al. [47] used discrete hashing
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to transform the fingerprint biometric, which is then encoded and
verified using error correcting codes.
4.2 Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)
Empirical results have shown the effectiveness of representations
learned by DNNs for image classification [18, 52, 72], and for the
verification of different biometric information [13, 42, 48]. How-
ever, ai.lock differs in its need to ensure that two object images
contain the exact same object, for the purpose of authentication.
ai.lock exploits the ability ofDNNs to learn features of the input im-
age space that capture the important underlying explanatory fac-
tors. We conjecture that these features will have small variations
among images of the same object or scene, captured in different
circumstances.
Pretrained Inception.v3. Training a DNN with millions of pa-
rameters is computationally expensive and requires a large train-
ing dataset of labeled data, rarely available in practice. Instead, we
employed a transfer learning [61] approach: obtain a trained DNN
and use it for a similar task. For image feature extraction, we use
Inception.v3 [64] network pretrained on ImageNet dataset [16], of
1.2 million images of 1,000 different object categories, for image
classification.
4.3 Locality Sensitive Hashing
Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) seeks to reduce the dimension-
ality of data, while probabilistically preserving the distance prop-
erties of the input space. It was initially used to solve the near
neighbor search problem in high dimensional spaces [28]. While
seemingly the ideal candidate to provide the ai.lock functionality,
LSH does not work well on images: images of the same scene or
object, captured in different conditions, e.g., angle, distance, illu-
mination, will have dramatically different pixel values, leading to
a high distance between the images and thus also between their
LSH values.
We use however Charikar’s [12] LSH as a building block in ai.lock.
Charikar’s [12] LSH defines a family of hash functions in the space
Rd . Specifically, the LSH function hr is based on a randomly cho-
sen d-dimensional Gaussian vector with independent components
r ∈ Rd , where hr (u) = 1 if r · u ≥ 0 and hr (u) = 0 if r · u < 0,
where · denotes the inner product. is function provides the prop-
erty that Pr [hr (u) = hr (v)] = 1 −
θ (u,v)
π , for any vectors u and v ,
where θ(u,v) denotes the angle between the input vectors.
4.4 Privacy Preserving Image Matching
Traditional approaches to object matching and object recognition,
e.g., SIFT [39] and SURF [8], rely on extracting identifying features
or (robust/invariant) keypoints and their descriptors at specific lo-
cations on the image. Several solutions have been proposed for
the secure image matching problem that could be applied to the
image based authentication task. SecSIFT [53] employed order-
preserving encryption and distributes the SIFT computation among
different servers. Hsu et al. [27] proposed a privacy preserving
SIFT based on homomorphic encryption, while Bai et al. [7] per-
formed SURF feature extraction in encrypted domain using Pail-
lier’s homomorphic cryptosystem. Wang et al. [70] improve the
SURF algorithm in encrypted domain by designing protocols for
Figure 2: ai.lock architecture. ai.lock processes the input im-
age through a deep neural network (i.e., Inception.v3), se-
lects relevant features, then uses locality sensitive hashing
to map them to a binary imageprint. ai.lock uses a classifier
to identify the ideal error tolerance threshold (τ ), used by the
secure sketch block to lock and match imageprints.
secure multiplication and comparison, that employ a “somewhat”
homomorphic encryption. ese approaches are not practical on
mobile devices, due to the high cost of homomorphic encryption
and the large number of keypoints (up to thousands per image).
4.5 Token-Based Authentication
In previous work [6]we have evaluated the usability of Pixie, a trin-
ket based authentication solution that employs slightly outdated
image processing techniques to extract features (i.e., “keypoints”)
and match user captured images. Pixie has an important drawback
when deployed on mobile devices: the image keypoints that it ex-
tracts need to be stored and matched in cleartext on vulnerable de-
vices. In contrast, ai.lock uses state of the art, deep neural network
based image feature extraction along with LSH to extract binary
imageprints that are robust to changes in image capture conditions.
e imageprints can be securely stored and matched using secure
sketches. ismakes ai.lock resilient to device capture aacks. Fur-
thermore, on larger and more complex aack datasets, the use of
DNNs enabled ai.lock to achieve false accept rates that are at least
2 orders of magnitude smaller than those of Pixie (≤ 0.0015% vs.
0.2 − 0.8%), for similar FRRs (4%).
ai.lock’s secret physical object is similar to token-based authen-
tication, either hardware or soware. For instance, SecurID [57]
generates pseudo-random, 6 digit authentication codes. ai.lock’s
Shannon entropy is slightly lower than SecurID’s 19.93 bits (see
Table 1 for comparison). Several authentication solutions use vi-
sual tokens (e.g., barcodes or QR codes). For instance, McCune,
et al. [41] proposed Seeing-is-Believing, a schema that relies on a
visual authentication channel that is realized through scanning a
barcode. Hayashi et al. [24] introduced WebTicket, a web account
management system that asks the user to print or store a 2D bar-
code on a secondary device and present it to the authentication de-
vice’s webcam in order to authenticate to a remote service. Token-
based authentication requires an expensive infrastructure [1] (e.g.
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Symbol Description
λ Length of the imageprint for a single image segment
τ Error tolerance threshold
c Correctable number of bits
s Number of image segments in multi segment schema
t Segment-based secret sharing threshold
Table 2: ai.lock notations.
for issuing, managing, synchronizing the token). ai.lock provides
a “hash-like” construct for arbitrary object images, making objects
usable as passwords, with the existing infrastructure.
Other approaches exist that seek to transform biometrics into
tokens that the user needs to carry, with important implications on
biometric privacy and revocation capabilities. For instance, TAPS [2]
is a glove sticker with a unique fingerprint intended for TouchID.
5 THE AI.LOCK SOLUTION
We introduce ai.lock, the first locality sensitive image mapping
function, and a practical image based authentication system. In
the following, we describe the basic solution, then introduce two
performance enhancing extensions.
5.1 ai.lock: e Basic (SLSS) Solution
ai.lock consists of 3 main modules (see Figure 2): (1) deep image-to-
embedding (DI2E) conversion module (2) feature selection module,
and (3) LSH based binary mapping module. We now describe each
module and its interface with the secure sketch module (see § 4.1).
Table 2 summarizes the important ai.lock parameter notations.
Deep image to embedding (DI2E) module. Let I be the fixed
size input image. Let Emb : I → Re be a function that converts
images into feature vectors of size e . We call Emb(I ) the embedding
vector, an abstract representation of I . To extract Emb(I ), ai.lock
uses the activations of a certain layer of Inception.v3 DNN [64]
when I is the input to the network. Let e denote the size of the
output of the layer of the DNN used by ai.lock. us, Emb(I ) ∈ Re .
Feature selection module. We have observed that not all the
components in the embedding feature vectors are relevant to our
task (see § 7.1). erefore, we reduce the dimensionality of the fea-
ture vectors to improve the performance and decrease the process-
ing burden of ai.lock. Let P : Re → Rp , where p < e be a function
that reduces the features of an embedding to the ones that are most
important. ai.lock uses PCAwith component range selection as the
P function, and applies it to Emb(I ) to find a set of components that
can reflect the distinguishing features of images. us, the vector
produced by feature selection module is P(Emb(I )) ∈ Rp .
LSH based binary mapping module. In a third step, ai.lock
seeks to map P(Emb(I )) to a binary space of size λ that preserves
the similarity properties of the input space. To address this prob-
lem, we use the LSH scheme proposed by Charikar [12]. Let L :
Rp → {0, 1}λ be such a mapping function. ai.lock uses as L, a
random binary projection LSH as follows. Let M be a matrix of
size p × λ, i.e. λ randomly chosen p-dimensional Gaussian vectors
with independent components. Calculate b as the dot product of
P(Emb(I )) and M . For each coordinate of b , output either 0 or 1,
based on the sign of the value of the coordinate. We call this bi-
nary representation of the input image I , i.e. π (I ) = L(P(Emb(I ))),
Figure 3: (a) 3 overlapping segments of an image. (b) Top:
sample images generated by DCGAN, Bottom: visually simi-
lar images in Nexus Dataset to images generatedby DCGAN.
its imageprint. We denote the length of a single imageprint by λ.
Note that, the hash value for the Charikar’s method is a single bit
(λ = 1). erefore, L can be viewed as a function that returns a
concatenation of λ such random projection bits.
In § 7.4 we provide empirical evidence that the function h =
L ◦P ◦Emb is a (τ )-LSIM transform (see § 7.1), for specific τ values.
Secure sketch. ai.lock extends the secure sketch under the Ham-
ming distance of [17] to securely store the binary imageprint cre-
dentials and perform image password set and image based authen-
tication as described in § 4.1.
In the following, we introduce two ai.lock extensions, intended
to increase the entropy provided by ai.lock’s output. First, we mod-
ify ai.lock to use the embedding vectors obtained frommultiple lay-
ers of Inception.v3 network. Second, we extend ai.lock to split the
input image into multiple overlapping segments and concatenate
their resulting binary representations.
5.2 ai.lock with Multiple DNN Layers
Representations learned by a DNN are distributed in different lay-
ers of these networks. e lower (initial) layers of convolutional
neural networks learn low level filters (e.g. lines, edges), while
deeper layers learn more abstract representations [73]. e use of
a single DNN layer prevents the basic ai.lock solution from taking
advantage of both filters.
To address this issue, we propose an ai.lock extension that col-
lects the embedding vectors frommultiple (l ) layers of Inception.v3
network. In addition, we modify the basic ai.lock feature extractor
module as follows. e Principal Components (PCs) of activations
for each layer are computed separately and are mapped to a sepa-
rate binary string of length λ. en, the binary strings constructed
from different layers are concatenated to create a single imageprint
for the input image. us, the length of the imageprint increases
linearly with the number of layers used in this schema.
5.3 ai.lock with Multiple Image Segments
We divide the original image into s overlapping segments (see Fig-
ure 3(a)). We then run the basic ai.lock over each segment sepa-
rately to produce s different imageprints of length λ. However, we
identify the PCs for the embedding vectors of each segment based
on the whole size images. e intuition for this choice is that ran-
dom image segments are not good samples of real objects and may
confuse the PCA. We then generate the imageprint of the original,
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whole size image, as the concatenation of the imageprints of its
segments.
Secure sketch sharing. We extend the secure sketch solution
with a (t , s)-secret sharing scheme. Specifically, let x1, .., xs be
(t , s)-shares of the random x , i.e., given any t shares, one can recon-
struct x . Given a reference image R, let R(1), ..R(s) be its segments,
and let π
(i )
R
= π (R(i )), i = 1..s be their imageprints. en, we store
SS(R,x) = 〈SS
(1)
1 , .., SS
(s)
1 , SS2〉, where SS
(i )
1 = π
(i )
R
⊕ ECC(xi ) and
SS2 = H (x). To authenticate, the user needs to provide a candi-
date image C , whose segments C(i ), i = 1..s produce imageprints
π
(i )
C
= π (C(i )) that are able to recover at least t of x’s shares xi .
6 IMPLEMENTATION & DATA
We build ai.lock on top of the Tensorflow implementation for In-
ception.v3 network [67]. For the error correcting code of secure
sketches, we use a BCH [11, 26] open source library [30], for syn-
drome computation and syndrome decodingwith correction capac-
ity of up to c bits. e value for c is calculated empirically using
the training dataset (see § 7.1)
Basic (SLSS) ai.lock. In the basic ai.lock solution, we use the out-
put of the last hidden layer of Inception.v3 network, before the
somax classifier, consisting of 2, 048 float values. Our intuition is
that this layer provides a compact representation (set of features)
for the input image objects, that is efficiently separable by the so-
max classifier.
Multi layer ai.lock. For the multi DNN layer ai.lock variants, we
have used 2 layers (l = 2). e first layer is the “Mixed 8/Pool 0”
layer and the second layer is the last hidden layer in Inception.v3.
e embedding vector for the “Mixed 8/Pool 0” consists of 49, 152
float values. As described in § 5.3, the embedding vectors of each
layer are separately processed by the feature selection and LSH
modules; the resulting binary strings are concatenated to form the
imageprint of size 2λ.
Multi segment ai.lock. For the multi segment ai.lock variant, we
split the image into multiple segments that we process indepen-
dently. Particularly, we consider 5 overlapping segments, cropped
from the top-le, boom-le, top-right, boom-right and the cen-
ter of the image. We generate segments whose width and height
is equal to the width and height of the initial image divided by 2,
plus 50 pixels to ensure overlap. e extra 50 pixels are added to
the interior sides for the side segments. For the middle segment,
25 pixels are added to each of its sides. Each segment is then inde-
pendently processed with the basic ai.lock (i.e., last hidden layer
of Inception.v3, PCA, LSH).
Multi layer multi segment ai.lock. is is a hybrid of the above
variants: split the image into 5 overlapping parts, then process
each part through Inception.v3 network, and extract the activation
vectors for each of the two layers of Inception.v3 (the last hidden
layer and Mixed 8/Pool 0 layer). e output of each layer for each
segment is separately processed as in the basic ai.lock. us, the
resulting imageprint of the image has 10λ bits.
6.1 Primary Data Sets
6.1.1 Real Images.
Nexus dataset. We have used a Nexus 4 device to capture 1,400
photos of 350 objects, belonging to 33 object categories. Example
of object categories in this dataset includes watches, shoes, jewelry,
shirt paerns, and credit cards. We have captured 4 images of each
object, that differ in background and lighting conditions.
ALOI dataset. We have used the “illumination direction” subset of
the Amsterdam Library of Object Images (ALOI) [22] dataset. is
dataset includes 24 different images of 1000 unique objects (24,000
in total) that are taken under different illumination angles.
Google dataset. We have used Google’s image search to retrieve
at least 200 images from each of the 33 object categories of the
Nexus image dataset, for a total of 7,853 images. is dataset forms
the basis of a “targeted” aack.
YFCC100M toy dataset. We have extracted a subset of the Yahoo
Flickr Creative Commons 100M (YFCC100M) [69] image dataset
(100 million Flickr images), of 126,600 Flickr images tagged with
the “toy” keyword, and not with “human” or “animal” keywords.
6.1.2 Synthetic Data.
Synthetic image dataset. Manually capturing the Nexus dataset
was a difficult and time consuming process. In order to efficiently
generate a large dataset of similar images, we have leveraged the
ability of generative models to discover an abstract representation
that captures the essence of the training samples. Generative mod-
els, including Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [23], are
trained to generate samples that are similar to the data they have
been trained on. Such models have been shown to be suitable for
representation learning tasks, e.g., [54].
We have used a DCGAN network [54] to generate a large set
of synthetic images that are similar to the images in the Nexus
dataset. Specifically, we have trained a DCGAN network [54] us-
ing the images of the Nexus dataset for 100 training epochs. Im-
age augmentation, e.g., rotation, enhancement, and zoom, is per-
formed to artificially increase the number of Nexus image dataset
samples to include 20 variants per image. We then used the trained
network to generate synthetic images: generate a random vector
(z) drawn from the uniform distribution, then feed z to DCGAN’s
generator network to construct an image. We repeated this process
to generate 200,000 images, that form our synthetic image dataset.
Figure 3(b) shows sample images generated by this network, along-
side similar images from the Nexus dataset.
Synthetic credential dataset. We have generated the binary im-
ageprints for the images in Nexus dataset based on the best param-
eters of ai.lock (see § 7.1). For each considered λ value, we consider
the value at each position of the binary imageprint as an indepen-
dent Bernoulli random variable. We then calculate the probability
of observing a 1 in each position based on the imageprints of the
Nexus dataset. We use these probabilities to draw 100,000 random
samples (of length λ) from the corresponding Bernoulli distribu-
tion for each position. e resulting random binary imageprints
form our synthetic credential dataset. We have experimented with
10 values of λ ranging from 50 to 500, thus, this dataset contains 1
million synthetic imageprints.
6.2 Evaluation Datasets
We use the above image datasets to generate authentication sam-
ples that consist of one candidate image and one reference image.
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ai.lock attack dataset. We use roughly 85% of the images from
the Nexus, ALOI and Google datasets as a training set to train and
estimate the performance of ai.lock. We use the remaining 15%
of images in each dataset (i.e., 220 Nexus, 3,600 ALOI and 1,178
Google images) as a holdout set. We use the holdout dataset to
assess the generalization error of the final model, and as a real
image aack dataset (see § 7.3).
We generate the samples in holdout dataset using each subset
of Nexus, ALOI and Google separately as follows. Each image of
the Nexus holdout dataset is chosen as a reference image once,
then coupled once with all the other images in the Nexus, ALOI
and Google sets, used as candidate images. erefore, there are
220×219
2 = 24, 090 combinations of samples for the images in the
Nexus set. For each 55 unique objects in this set, there are 6 (
(4
2
)
)
possible valid samples that compare one image of this object to an-
other image of the same object. us, there are 55 × 6 = 330 valid
samples in the Nexus set. We then generate 220 × 3, 600 = 792K
and 220× 1, 178 = 259, 160 invalid samples from comparing Nexus
images to images in ALOI and Google sets respectively. erefore,
the ai.lock holdout set contains a total of 1, 075, 250 samples.
In addition, the training set is further divided into 5 folds, for
cross validation. Each training fold contains 236, 4, 080 and 1, 335
images of Nexus, ALOI and Google datasets respectively. ere-
fore, there are 236×2352 = 27, 730 samples for the fold’s 59 unique
Nexus set objects, of which 59 × 6 = 354 pairs are valid. Similarly,
we generate 236 × 4, 080 = 962, 880 and 236 × 1, 335 = 315, 060
invalid samples, that consist of Nexus images coupled with ALOI
and Google images, respectively. us, each training fold has a
total of 1, 305, 670 samples, of which 354 are valid.
Synthetic image attack datasets. We divide the synthetic image
dataset of § 6.1 into 2 equal sets, each containing 100,000 images.
en, we build two synthetic image aack datasets (DS1 and DS2)
by repeating the following process for each subset of the synthetic
image dataset: combine each Nexus dataset image, used as a ref-
erence image, with each image from the subset of the synthetic
image dataset, used as a candidate image. erefore, in total we
have 140 million samples in each of DS1 and DS2.
Synthetic credential attack dataset. We use the synthetic cre-
dential dataset described in § 6.1 to build a synthetic credential at-
tack dataset: for each value of λ, combine the imageprint of each
Nexus dataset image, used as a reference imageprint, with each
imageprint in synthetic credential dataset, used as the candidate
imageprint. Hence, we have 140 million authentication samples
in this dataset for each value of λ. We repeat this process for 10
values of λ, ranging from 50 to 500. erefore, in total this dataset
contains 10 × 140 M = 1.4 billion samples.
Illumination robustness evaluation dataset. To evaluate the
performance of ai.lock under illumination changes, we use theALOI
holdout set (3, 600 images) that includes up to 11 images of each
object captured under a different illumination condition. Specifi-
cally, we pair each image in the ALOI holdout set (i.e., not used
during training) with all the other images in this set. erefore,
we have a total of 3600×35992 = 6, 478, 200 authentication samples
in the illumination robustness evaluation dataset, of which 6, 306
samples are valid.
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Figure 4: Comparison of ai.lock performance (F1 score)
when using different subset of principal component feature
ranks for different imageprint length (λ) values. PCs ranked
200-400 constantly outperform other tested subsets.
Entropy evaluationdataset. We randomly selected 2 billion unique
pairs of images from the YFCC100M toy dataset. In each pair, an
image is considered to be the reference, the other is the candidate.
7 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluate ai.lock and its variants. First, we describe the process
we used to identify the best ai.lock parameters. We use these pa-
rameters to evaluate the performance of ai.lock under the aack
datasets of § 6.2. We also show that ai.lock is a δ -LSIM function,
empirically estimate its entropy, andmeasure its speed on a mobile
device.
7.1 ai.lock: Parameter Choice
We identify the best parameters for the ai.lock variants using 5 fold
cross validation on the ai.lock training dataset (see § 6.2).
Best principal component range. To identify the best PC range,
we use 5 fold cross validation as follows. First, we retrieve the
embedding vector (output of the last hidden layer of Inception.v3)
for each image in the ai.lock training dataset. en, for each cross
validation experiments, we use 4 training folds to find the principal
components of the embedding vectors. en, we transform the
embedding vectors of the test fold into the newly identified feature
space. Finally, we project them into several randomly generated
vectors (LSH) to construct the binary imageprint of the images.
We have experimentedwith different subsets of the transformed
feature space of various size including the first and second consec-
utive principal component sets of size 50, 100, 150, and 200, as well
as, the first 400 PCs.
Figure 4 shows the cross validation performance achieved by
ai.lock when using different subsets of PC features for different λ
values. We observe that the PCs ranked 200-400 perform consis-
tently the best. is might seem surprising, as higher ranked PCs
have higher variability and thus we expected that they would have
more impact in differentiating between valid and invalid samples.
We conjecture that some of the lower rank coordinates of these
transformed vectors are more efficient in capturing the lower level
details of the input object images that differentiate them fromother
object images.
Identify the best threshold. We identify the best threshold that
separates the valid from the invalid authentication samples using
the binary imageprints of the testing folds in each of the 5 cross
validation experiments using ai.lock training set. Particularly, we
normalize the Hamming distance of each pair of imageprints in the
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Figure 5: (a-c) ai.lock cross validation performance, and (d-f) ai.lock holdout performance using different ai.lock variants:
Single Layer Single Segment (SLSS), Multi Layer Single Segment (MLSS), Single Layer Multi Segment (SLMS),Multi Layer Multi
Segment (MLMS). Exploiting information frommultiple Inception.v3 DNN layers (multi layer variants) lowers the FRR, while
splitting images into smaller segments (multi segment variants) lowers the FAR. e MLMS variant of ai.lock consistently
achieves the lowest FAR, that can be as low as 0% for the holdout dataset.
λ 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
τ × 10 7.80 7.30 7.07 6.95 6.80 6.87 6.80 6.85 6.87 6.82
Table 3: Error tolerance threshold (τ ) values for the basic
ai.lock obtained through cross validation over the ai.lock
dataset, when using PCs with feature ranked 200-400.
test fold by the length of the imageprints. en, we apply more
than 4K different real values, between 0 and 1, as a threshold on
the normalized Hamming distances of the authentication pairs to
classify them. At the end of the 5th cross validation experiment, we
select the threshold that has the maximum average performance,
in terms of F1 score, as the best separating threshold. We call this
the Error Tolerance reshold, which we denote by τ .
Table 3 reports the τ values for basic ai.lockwith different values
of λ, when using PCs with feature rank 200-400. We observe that
as λ increases, the value for τ decreases: we posit that larger λ
values preserve more information about the input vectors (PCs of
the embedding vectors) in the LSH output.
We translate τ to the error correcting capacity required for ECC.
Specifically, for an imageprint of length λ, we choose an ECC that
is able to correct up to c = ⌊λ × (1 − τ )⌋ bits.
ai.lock MLSS variant. Similar to the basic ai.lock, we have exper-
imented with multiple ranges of PCs and λ values to identify the
τ values for MLSS ai.lock, using the 5 fold cross validation experi-
ment on the ai.lock training dataset.
ai.lock: Multi segment variants. For this ai.lock variant, we
identify the τ values separately for each image segment, using the 5
cross validation experiment explained above. erefore, we end up
having 5 different τ values corresponding to each image segment.
e τ corresponding to each segment can be used to identify if
t (matching segment counts out of 5) 3 4 5
F1 score (%) for SLMS 93.13 90.95 85.84
F1 score (%) for MLMS 95.53 94.64 92.42
Table 4: Cross validation performance (F1 score) for differ-
ent values of t (number of segments that need to match out
of 5) when using PCs with feature rank 200-400 and λ = 500
for SLMS and MLMS variants of ai.lock. t = 3 consistently
achieves the best performance.
there is a match between the piece of the candidate image to the
corresponding piece in the reference image. We say that the whole
candidate and reference images match, when t of their segments
match. We have tested with t ranging from 3 to 5 and observed
that t=3 achieved the best F1 score (see Table 4).
Cross validation performance. We now report the cross valida-
tion performance of ai.lock with the parameters identified above,
for λ ranging from 50 to 500. Figures 5(a)-(c) compare the F1 score,
FAR and FRR values of the best version of the ai.lock variants (ba-
sic SLSS, SLMS, MLSS, and MLMS) over the 5-fold cross validation
experiments, using ai.lock training dataset. e performance of
all ai.lock variants improves with increasing the value of λ. e
MLMS ai.lock achieves the best performance, with an F1 score of
95.52% and FAR of 0.0009% when λ = 500. e MLSS ai.lock also
consistently improves over the basic ai.lock, with a smaller FRR
and a smaller or at most equal FAR. Its FRR (4.18% for λ = 500) is
slightly smaller than that of MLMS variants (5.36%), but it exhibits
a slight increase in FAR. For large values of λ, the FRR of SLMS and
SLSS are almost equivalent.
e average cross validation Equal Error Rate (EER, the rate at
which the FAR = FRR) of ai.lock for the SLSS and MLSS variants is
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λ 50 150 250 350 500
FAR×10+6 33.87 4.34 3.29 0.69 0.20
Table 5: SLSS ai.lock performance on synthetic attack DS1.
e FAR decreases significantly as λ grows from 50 to 500.
e FAR when λ = 500 is only 0.2 × 10−6.
less than 0.67% and 0.17% respectively when using PCs with fea-
ture rank 200 − 400 and λ = 500.
e purpose of the LSH-based transformation is to encode the
feature vector of an image extracted by a DNN into a binary string.
Our conjecture is that larger lambda values extract more high qual-
ity information about the feature vectors, which in turn leads to
lower FAR and FRR. is is partly due to the random nature of the
LSH we used (see Figure 9), where roughly half of the bits among
different images are different, and images of the same object have a
smaller distance overall. Using more LSH bits reduces the variance
of the distance that was due to perturbations from using a random
projection, hence provides a beer separation between TP and FP
image comparisons.
7.2 Resilience to Illumination Changes
We evaluate the resilience of ai.lock to illumination changes us-
ing the 6,478,200 authentication samples of the illumination robust-
ness evaluation dataset (§ 6.2). While the FAR of the MLMS vari-
ant of ai.lock (for λ = 500 and t = 3) remains very small (0.006%),
its FRR increases to 16.9%. Decreasing the required matching seg-
ments count (t ) to 2, reduces the FRR to 11.43%, which results in a
slightly higher FAR of 0.010%.
7.3 ai.lock Under Attack
Holdout dataset, real image attack. e performance over the
ai.lock holdout set is reported in Figure 5(d)-(f). As before, the
performance of all the ai.lock variants improves with the increase
in λ. In agreement with the results of the cross validation experi-
ments, we conclude that exploiting information from multiple In-
ception.v3 layers decreases the FRR, while using information from
multiple image segments decreases the FAR. In addition, theMLMS
ai.lock variant achieves the highest F1 score (97.21% for λ = 500).
e SLMS and MLMS schema consistently achieve the lowest FAR,
which is as low as 0% on the holdout dataset.
Synthetic image attack. We use the synthetic aack dataset DS1
of § 6.2 to evaluate the performance of SLSS ai.lock, using the
trained parameters of § 7.1. Table 5 shows the performance of
ai.lock in classifying these aack samples. e FAR decreases sig-
nificantly with λ, and is as low as 0.00002% when λ = 500.
e proportion of the reference images that have been broken
at least once decreases significantly by increasing λ: from 16.86%
to 0.79% (11 Nexus images) when λ is 150 and 500 respectively. A
majority of the broken references are broken only by a small num-
ber of candidate images: when λ = 500, only 2 of the 11 broken
images have been broken 5 times by the synthetic images in DS1.
e average number of trials until finding the first matching syn-
thetic image, over the 11 broken reference images, is 31,800.
Vaccinated ai.lock. To further improve the ai.lock resistance to
synthetic image aacks, we use the synthetic image aack dataset
DS2 (see § 6.2) along with the ai.lock training dataset, to train
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Figure 6: (a) Cross validation FAR, (b) Cross validation FRR ,
(c) Holdout FAR, and (d) Holdout FRR of SLSS ai.lock when
trained over the ai.lock and synthetic image attacks of DS2.
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Figure 7: FAR of ai.lock on synthetic image attack, when
trained on the ai.lock dataset vs. when trained also on DS2.
e “vaccinated” ai.lock improves its resistance to the syn-
thetic image attack: the FAR drops by more than 74%, 51%
and 59% when λ is 50, 150 and 350 respectively.
ai.lock. Specifically, we divide the synthetic image aack dataset
DS2 into 5 folds and distribute them into the 5 training folds of the
ai.lock dataset. In other words, we train ai.lock on an additional
236 × 20,000 = 4,720,000 invalid authentication samples. e hold-
out set remains untouched and is used to evaluate the effectiveness
of this approach. en, we train ai.lock with SLSS as before using
the cross validation experiment (see § 7.1).
We experimented with two cases. First, the invalid synthetic im-
age aack samples in DS2 contribute to both the PCA based feature
selection and the error tolerant threshold (τ ) discovery processes.
Second, those samples are only used in the process of discovering
τ . Figure 6 shows the cross validation FAR and FRR (a, b) as well as
the performance over the holdout set (c, d). In both experiments,
we observed a drop in the FAR of ai.lock, however, the FRR in-
creases. e FAR improvement is higher for the second case. We
conjecture that the inclusion of synthetic, not camera captured im-
ages, is misleading the PCA based feature selection module into
capturing irrelevant information.
We used the ai.lock trained on the synthetic image aack dataset
DS2 to evaluate its performance over the synthetic image aack
DS1. Figure 7 compares the performance of ai.lock when trained
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λ 50 150 250 350 500
FAR×10+6 11.89 0.09 0.03 0.000 0.000
Table 6: SLSS ai.lock performance on the synthetic creden-
tial attack. ai.lock is unbreakable under 1.4 billion samples
of the synthetic credential attack: its FAR is 0 when λ ≥ 300.
λ 150 350 500
P1 8.6e-1 9.3e-1 9.1e-1
P2 2.8e-6 0.0 0.0
Table 7: Average probability of collision, for valid (P1) and in-
valid (P2) samples in the ai.lock holdout set, when the ai.lock
imageprint is considered as image hash value and at most
c = ⌊λ × (1 − τ )⌋ bits of error is allowed. In all cases, P1 > P2,
thus conclude that ai.lock is an LSIM function.
on the ai.lock dataset and when trained on the ai.lock and the syn-
thetic dataset DS2. Training also over synthetic image aack sam-
ples helps ai.lock to be more resilient to synthetic image aack,
especially for small values of λ.
Synthetic credential attack. Table 6 shows the FAR values for
ai.lock under the synthetic credential aack dataset described in
§ 6.2. For all values of λ greater than 300, the FAR of ai.lock is
equal to 0. Even for a λ of 50, the FAR is 11.89 × 10−4%. is is an
important result: even a powerful adversary who can create and
test synthetic credentials on a large scale, is unable to break the
ai.lock authentication.
7.4 Is ai.lock δ -LSIM?
We now evaluate if the basic ai.lock (SLSS) variant, with the param-
eters identified in § 7.1 preserves the similarity of the input space,
i.e., if it satisfies the LSIM properties (see Definition 3.1). We use
the ai.lock holdout set to evaluate the probability of obtaining the
same hash value for valid and invalid samples.
Let πi and πj be the imageprints corresponding to two images
in the ai.lock holdout set. Let dH (πi ,πj ) denote the Hamming dis-
tance and SH (πi ,πj ) denote the normalized Hamming similarity of
these imageprints, i.e., SH (πi ,πj ) = 1 −
dH (πi ,πj )
λ
.
e output of ai.lock can be considered either as a single bit or
a string of bits. In the former case, the imageprints consist of the
concatenation of the output of multiple hash functions, while in
the later case, the entire imageprint is assumed to be the ai.lock
hash value. In the following, we empirically evaluate the P1 and
P2 values (see Definition §3.1), for the case where the entire ai.lock
imageprint is considered as the hash value. In Appendix C, we
further show that ai.lock is also a δ -LSIM function when its hash
value is a single bit.
We set δ = τ , where τ is the error tolerance threshold obtained
from the ai.lock training process (see Table 3), for different values
of λ. Table 7 shows the P1 and P2 values achieved by the basic
ai.lock over the holdout dataset. We perform Mann-Whitney one-
sided test with alternative hypothesis P1 > P2. Based on the ob-
served p − value = 0.00, (α = 0.05), for different values of λ, we
conclude that the alternative hypothesis is true, hence, ai.lock is a
δ -LSIM function over the holdout dataset.
λ 150 250 350 500
DI2E module (Inception v.1) 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
DI2E module (Inception v.3) 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
PCA + LSH module 0.044 0.049 0.051 0.066
Table 8: Processing time (in seconds) of SLSS ai.lock mod-
ules, for different values of λ. When using Inception.h5, the
overall ai.lock speed is below 0.8s.
7.5 On the Entropy of Imageprints
We have used the entropy evaluation dataset (see § 6.2) to empir-
ically calculate the entropy of the imageprints generated by the
ai.lock variants. e empirical entropy of an authentication solu-
tion is propositional to the size of the keyspace that the aacker
needs to search to find a match for the authentication secret. For
biometric information, estimating this size is difficult. In such cases,
the entropy can be estimated as −loд2(
1
FAR ) [46]. We performed
this study for different values of λ and the best parameter choice
of ai.lock (see § 7.1), using the entropy evaluation dataset.
On the 2 billion image pairs in the entropy evaluation dataset,
the FAR of the SLSS ai.lock variant is 0.020% and 0.035% when λ
is 50 and 500 respectively, for an entropy of 12.28 bits and 11.48
bits. We have visually inspected several hundreds of image pairs
that resulted in false accepts and observed that a significant propor-
tion were due to images that contained the same object type, e.g.
ribbons, helmets, etc. is result is not unexpected: the SLSS vari-
ant uses only the last hidden layer of Inception.v3 network. Since
Inception.v3 is trained for image classification task, it is expected
to have similar activations on the last hidden layer for images of
the same object type. We expect to eliminate this situation by re-
quiring the match between activations of multiple inception layers
(multi layer variant).
e FAR of the MLMS ai.lock variant on the entropy evaluation
dataset, for λ values of 500 and 150, is 0.0007% and 0.0004% respec-
tively. erefore, the estimated entropy of ai.lock imageprints is
17.14 and 18.02 bits respectively.
7.6 ai.lock Speed
We have implemented ai.lock using Android 7.1.1 and Tensorflow
0.12.1 and have evaluated its speed using 1,000 images of the Nexus
dataset on a Nexus 6P smartphone (alcomm Snapdragon 810
CPU and 3GB RAM). Table 8 shows the average processing time
of the 3 main ai.lock modules for different values of λ. Indepen-
dent of the value for λ, ai.lock’s DI2E module takes 1.9s to com-
pute the activations of all the layers of Inception.v3. When using
Inception.h5 [63] (a smaller network), DI2E module takes 0.7s. e
combined PCA and LSH speed increases with the value of λ, but
is below 70ms for λ = 500. e processing overhead of ai.lock is
below 2s and 1s using Inception.v3 and Inception.h5 respectively.
Tominimize its impact on user experience on aNexus 6P, ai.lock
needs to use Inception.h5. e most significant processing over-
head of ai.lock is on computing the activation of the DNN, which
directly depends on the size of the network. Note that compress-
ing the network using the DNN distillation approach [25] can al-
leviate this overhead. Future device and Inception improvements
will likely improve the ai.lock performance and accuracy.
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8 DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
Default authentication, revocation and recovery. If the image
based authentication fails a number of times or the ai.lock secret
is not available, the authentication falls back to the default authen-
tication mechanism, e.g. text passwords.
Strong passwords. ai.lock benefits from users choosing strong,
high-entropy and unique objects for authentication. ai.lock can
use datasets of images of frequently occurring, thus low entropy,
objects and learn to reject similar objects during their registration
by the user. Further, the image classification task can be adapted to
detect images belonging to classes of weak, low-entropy authenti-
cation objects. In addition, similar to text passwords, users could
be encouraged to pick an ordered combination of personal objects
for authentication.
Usability. Although usability is not the focus of this paper, we ex-
pect ai.lock to share several limitations with face based authentica-
tion mechanisms due to their similarities in the form factor. ese
include susceptibility to inappropriate lighting conditions [9]. While
the FAR of ai.lock remains small under illumination changes, its
FRR increases, affecting its usability. However, DNNs are capable
of learning representations that are invariant to input changes, e.g.
lighting, translation, etc. us, the DI2E module of ai.lock can be
further fine-tuned to bemore resistant to illumination changes. We
leave the investigation of such improvement for future work.
In [6] we have evaluated the usability aspects of an image based
authentication approach, and have shown that (1) the user entry
time was significantly shorter compared to text passwords on a
mobile device, (2) the participants were able to remember their au-
thentication objects 2 and 7 days aer registering them, and (3) the
participants perceived object based authentication to be easier to
use than text passwords, and were willing to adopt it. Further stud-
ies are required to understand (1) the user choice of the secret ob-
jects or scenes and whether it impacts the secret key space, (2) the
ability of ai.lock to filter out common or low-entropy images, (3)
the scenarios where users are willing to adopt ai.lock authentica-
tion and (4) other limitations associated to ai.lock authentication.
Shoulder surfing. Similar to face based authentication, ai.lock
is vulnerable to shoulder surfing aacks where the adversary cap-
tures images of the objects or scenes used by victims. However,
ai.lock eliminates remote aacks, e.g., [51], moves the target away
from sensitive body features, and enables users to trivially change
their image-passwords. Similar to biometrics, ai.lock can also ben-
efit from liveness verification techniques [55], that ensure that the
adversary has physical access to the authentication object or scene,
to prevent sophisticated image replay aacks. In addition, in Ap-
pendix B we show that the knowledge of the authentication ob-
ject type does not provide the adversary with significant advantage
when launching a brute force aack.
Multi-factor authentication. ai.lock can also be used in conjunc-
tion with other authentication solutions. For instance, the image
password set and authentication steps described in § 4.1 can take
advantage of a secondary secret (e.g. password, PIN), increasing
the number of authentication factors to improve security. To this
end, let r be a random salt. Wemodify x in the fuzzy biometric pro-
tection solution outlined in § 4.1 to be the randomized hash of the
secondary secret computed using salt r . Randomized hashing en-
sures the required formaing and bit length for x can be achieved
using key derivation function (e.g. HKDF [36]), etc. e random
salt r needs to be stored along with the other authentication cre-
dentials, i.e. SS(R,x).
Compromised device. Our model assumes an adversary that
physically captures a victimfis device and thus has black-box ac-
cess to the authentication function. ai.lock is not resilient to an
adversary who installs malware on the victim device. Such mal-
ware may for instance leverage PlaceRaider [66] to construct three
dimensional models of the environment surrounding the victim,
including of the authentication object.
Trusted hardware can secure ai.lock and even obviate the need
for secure sketches. However, it would reduce the number of de-
viceswhere ai.lock can be applied. Techniques similar toAuDroid [50]
could be employed to ensure that unauthorized processes or exter-
nal parties cannot access and misuse the device camera, however,
they may still leave ai.lock vulnerable to cache aacks [38].
9 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced ai.lock, the first secure and efficient
image based authentication system. We have presented a suite of
practical yet powerful image based aacks and built large scale
aack datasets. We have shown that even under our powerful at-
tacks, ai.lock achieves beer entropy than state-of-the-art biomet-
ric authentication solutions.
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# of words in image search query 1 2 3 4
Dataset size (dsize ) 12, 413 24, 882 26, 418 26, 766
Avg # of trials before FA (random order) 12, 078 23, 205 24, 641 25, 028
Avg # of trials before FA (guessing aack) 12, 034 22, 755 23, 921 24, 488
Portion of broken references (%) 5.0 9.0 10.9 9.0
Table 9: ai.lock under the object guessing attack. e aver-
age number of trials before the first false accept (FA) drops
only slightly in the object guessing attack scenario when
compared to a random ordering of attack images. us,
knowledge of the authentication object type provides the ad-
versary only nominal guessing advantage.
A MOTIVATION FOR FEATURE SELECTION
USING PCA
Figure 8: PCA motivation: FRR vs. FAR of (i) ai.lock when
using PCA (with features ranked 200-400), (ii) ai.lock with
no feature selection (“Raw”), and (iii) 250 independent in-
stances of ai.lock when using a feature selection approach
that randomly selects 200 features. ai.lock with PCA consis-
tently achieves the lowest FRR and oen the lowest FAR.
We now justify the need for the PCA step of ai.lock. For this,
we compare the best version of ai.lock running PCA (i.e., features
ranked 200-400), with two other versions. First, we consider a base-
line version (which we call “Raw”), that uses no feature selection
component. Specifically, Raw applies LSH to the raw embedding
vectors, then, identifies the best threshold τ using the 5-fold cross
validation experiment described in § 7.1 for ai.lock. Second, we
compare against an ai.lock variant where we replace the PCA com-
ponent with a random choice of 200 features (of the embedding
vectors) produced by the last hidden layer of Inception.v3. Figure 8
shows the results of this comparison for λ values of 150, 250, 350
and 500, and 250 different instances of ai.lock with random feature
selection. We observe that ai.lock with PCs of rank 200-400 consis-
tently achieves the significantly lower FRR, and oen the lowest
FAR. In addition, we observe that randomly choosing the features
is not ideal, as it oen performs worse than when no feature selec-
tion is used at all.
B OBJECT/SCENE GUESSING ATTACK
Data. We have asked a graduate student to tag each of the 55
unique object images in the Nexus holdout set with 1 to 4 words.
For each value of the number of tags per image (i.e., 1 to 4), and
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λ 150 350 500
P1 0.799 0.797 0.796
P2 0.500 0.500 0.500
Table 10: Average probability of collision, for valid (P1) and
invalid (P2) samples in the ai.lock holdout set per imageprint
bit basis. In all cases, P1 > P2, thus conclude that ai.lockwith
single bit hash value is an LSIM function.
each object image, we collected 300-500 images provided byGoogle’s
image search engine. us, we generated 4 Google image datasets,
one for images found when searching with 1 tag, another when
searching with 2 tags, etc. In total, we have collected 90,479 im-
ages.
ai.lock performance under object guessing attack. We use
the 4 collected image datasets from Google to generate a total of
19, 905, 380 “guessing aack” authentication samples, and use them
to evaluate the guessing entropy [15] of ai.lock under an object/scene
guessing aack (see § 2).
Specifically, using each of the 4 Google image datasets we per-
form the following two brute force aacks. e first aack emu-
lates an object guessing aack: re-order the images in the Google
dataset to start the brute force aack with the images of the same
object type, then continue with images of other object categories
in a random order. Finally, count the number of trials before the
first match (false accept) occurs. e second aack is a standard
brute force aack: randomly shuffle the images in the Google im-
age dataset and use them to brute force each image in the Nexus
holdout set. We use the second aack as a baseline, to determine if
knowledge of the object type impacts the trial count to success. In
both aacks, we count each of the unbreakable reference images
as “success” at dsize trials, where dsize is the number of images in
the corresponding Google image dataset (see Table 9).
Table 9 summarizes the ai.lock performance under the object/scene
guessing aack scenario. We observe an increase in the portion of
the Nexus images that are broken when the simulated adversary
uses more words to describe the authentication objects for collect-
ing the aack image dataset. However, for all experiments, the
average number of trials before success drops only slightly in the
object guessing aack scenario compared to the baseline. is is
due to the fact that the reference images were mostly broken with
images of different object categories. We conclude that knowledge
of the secret object type does not provide the adversary with a sig-
nificant guessing advantage.
C IS AI.LOCK δ -LSIM FOR AI.LOCK WITH
SINGLE BIT HASH VALUE?
We now show that ai.lock with a single bit hash value is a δ -LSIM
(see Definition 3.1).
Figure 9: Histograms of normalizedHamming similarity be-
tween imageprints of valid and invalid authentication sam-
ples in the ai.lock holdout set. e red rectangles pinpoint
the focus areas: valid samples with Hamming similarity be-
low 0.6 and invalid samples withHamming similarity above
0.6. Higher values of λ provide more effective separation be-
tween valid and invalid samples: when λ = 500, no invalid
samples have similarity above 0.6.
ai.lock uses Charikar’s random projection LSH [12]. erefore,
for any embedding vector (the input to LSH function) u and v ,
Pr [1 bit collision] = 1 −
θ (u,v)
π , where θ(u,v) denotes the angle
between u and v . We use the angle between the feature vectors of
images in the ai.lock holdout set to compute the average probabil-
ity of collision: 0.79 for valid samples and 0.50 for invalid authen-
tication samples.
Figure 9 shows the histogram of normalized Hamming similar-
ity between imageprints in the valid and invalid samples of the
ai.lock holdout set. Unsurprisingly, most invalid samples have a
Hamming similarity between 0.4 and 0.6: different images have
imageprints that are similar in around half of their bits (see also
Table 10). We observe that the overlap between the Hamming simi-
larities of valid and invalid samples significantly reduces for higher
values of λ.
In addition, we compute these probabilities empirically by count-
ing the number of times when the hash values collide for valid
and invalid samples, aer the LSH transformation. We then use
this count to compute the average probability of collision for a
valid (P1) and invalid (P2) authentication samples (see Table 10).
We observe the remarkable similarity of these values, to the ones
above, computed analytically. As λ increases, the empirical P1 ap-
proaches the analytic lower bound (0.79). We perform a Mann-
Whitney one-sided test with alternative hypothesis P1 > P2. is
test suggests that there is a significant gap between P1 and P2
(p −value = 0.00,α = 0.05) for all cases, hence, ai.lock is a δ -LSIM
on the Nexus holdout dataset.
In addition, comparing the values for P1 and P2 with the ones
reported in § 7.4 for ai.lock with multi-bit hash value, we observe
that concatenating multiple hashes enlarges the gap between P1
and P2 values.
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